Let me start with two
simple questions.
1) Who is more likely to
be apprehensive about catching a sexually transmitted disease, A or B?
A) A chaste person
B) A promiscuous person
2) Who is more likely to
worry about banging their head on the top of a doorway, A or B?
A) A very short person
B) A very tall person
In both cases the answer
is obviously B, because the risk of catching a sexually transmitted disease or banging
your head on the top of a doorway are directly correlated with how much multi-partner sex you
have and how tall you are.
Now consider a third
question.
3) Who is more likely to worry
about a terrorist attack, A or B?
A) Someone who has a relatively
low risk of being the victim of a terrorist attack
B) Someone who has a relatively
high risk of being the victim of a terrorist attack
You'd think the answer
ought to be B again, but in this case I'm not so sure. I think there is
something about the human spirit that confounds expectations when the danger is
terrorism. Let me explain.
Consider two people - Jack and Bob. Jack lives and
works in London .
He commutes to and from work every day, and he eats and walks in central London every day. Bob
lives in Oxford , and visits London only very occasionally - no more than
once a year. Which one of them is at the highest risk of being the victim of a
terrorist incident? By a long way, the answer is Jack. He spends nearly every
day in the city in the UK
that is by far the most likely to experience a terrorist incident, whereas Bob
only visits the terrorism hotspot once annually.
But here's the interesting
thing; I'll bet on that one day in the year when Bob is on the same London tube
line as Jack, it is Bob who is most apprehensive about there being a terrorist
attack, not Jack. It might be true that if you add up the total apprehension
felt by both men in a year including calculating journey times, Jack has more
aggregate apprehension, but the specific point I'm making still, I think, holds
- which is that humans tend to greatly exaggerate small probabilities - and
someone commuting in London every day is less likely to overestimate the
probability of his being involved in a terrorist incident than someone who
visits London once a year.
The other part of this is
that terrorism engenders a fear and apprehension that is incommensurably
greater than the actual probability of being a victim of terrorism - so an infrequent
visitor to London would be more likely to have associative fear in relation to
the spectre of terrorism than a regular commuter would have, because the latter
has more acute daily experiences of the fact that terrorism is the exception to
the regularity of everyday London-based activity, not the rule.