Economics
tends to distinguish between two types of category discrimination. The first
category is what's called animus discrimination, which is discrimination motivated by aversion to a particular group of people based
solely on things like skin colour or sex. An example would be something like
not employing a woman because you're a misogynist, or charging a black man more
for a car than a white man because you're racist.
The second category
of discrimination is what's called statistical discrimination, which is
discrimination motivated by statistical trends associated with groups. An
example would be an insurance company charging women a lower premium than men
on the basis that they are statistically safer drivers, or counter terrorism
authorities targeting more Muslims at airports because there is a higher risk
that they will be terrorists.
The first type
of discrimination is rightly frowned upon by everyone most of the time.
Although even animus discrimination has its place in society. At school I
actively discriminated in favour of girls over boys in the dating market on
grounds that I was only attracted to
girls.
The second kind
of discrimination, statistical discrimination, is often frowned upon too. But
not always wisely, as people regularly miss the fact that statistical
discrimination is often a very wise kind of discrimination. Why wouldn't we target more Muslims at
airports if there is a higher risk that they will be terrorists? It's a no
brainer.
Statistical
discrimination is simply a case of someone making what they believe is a
rational distinction between good and bad outcomes, like when blind
people aren't recruited as lifeguards, and when snake-handling shamans are
not hired as primary school teachers. Other times people think
unfair discrimination is going on when, in fact, there is a perfectly
rational explanation for it.
A huge proportion of the
debates we see in the media about so-called unfair discrimination are really
enquiries about whether the discrimination is animus discrimination or whether
it is statistical discrimination - that is, whether the discrimination is coming
from a bad place or a good place. Sometimes, like in this
example, it is not always easy to tell.
Recently I read about a
couple of natural field experiments of significant interest in this matter. John
List and Uri Gneezy are to behavioural economics as Jimi Hendrix is to guitar
playing, and they have an interesting case study on what appears to be animus
discrimination against the disabled when it come to getting their car fixed:
"First, we recruited several men between the ages
of twenty-nine and forty-five to act as our secret agents. Half these men used
wheelchairs and drove specially equipped vehicles. The other half were
non-disabled, but in all cases the individuals hopped into a specially equipped
vehicle for the disabled with a fresh ding on the side and headed to
Chicago-area repair shops. When our secret agents got to an auto repair
shop they simply asked for a price quote to fix their car. What we found
initially was shocking. The disabled were given quotes 30 percent higher than
the quotes given to non-disabled for the exact same repair!
Curious about the extent to which car repairman were motivated by hatred or just profit motive, though, we did one run of the experiment where both types of our secret agents got a quote and told the repairman that they were, “getting three price quotes today. What did this extra sentence do? Well the figure shows that for the able-bodied subjects, their price quotes didn’t change at all, but for the disabled they plummeted. Furthermore, the difference in prices for the disabled and abled disappeared."
Whichever way we cut the
cloth, it seems like the repair men were engaging in blatant economic
discrimination by charging more because of a customer’s disability. Here's
another one: if you were looking for an iPod, would you care if the person
holding the device in a catalogue was black or white? Surely not, right?
But economists Jennifer
Doleac and Luke Stein suggest otherwise. Over the course of a year, they placed
hundreds of ads in local online markets, randomly altering whether the hand
holding an iPod for sale was black or white. Here's what they found:
"Black sellers do worse than white sellers on a
variety of market outcome measures: they receive 13% fewer responses and 17%
fewer offers. Conditional on receiving at least one offer, black sellers also
receive 2-4% lower offers, despite the self-selected-and presumably less
biased-pool of buyers. In addition, buyers corresponding with black sellers
exhibit lower trust: they are 17% less likely to include their name in e-mails,
44% less likely to accept delivery by mail, and 56% more likely to express
concern about making a long-distance payment. We find evidence that black
sellers suffer particularly poor outcomes in thin markets; it appears that
discrimination may not “survive” in the presence of significant competition
among buyers. Furthermore, black sellers do worst in the most racially isolated
markets and markets with high property crime rates, suggesting a role for
statistical discrimination in explaining the disparity."
Is this kind of
discrimination coming from a bad place or good place? Maybe many white people
still harbour an evolutionary hardwired animus-type of negativity towards black
skin, even though in terms of outward behaviour most don't act as if they do.
Or maybe the black skin is serving as some kind of misguided proxy for black
associations like higher crime rates (not that that's an excuse). It's
difficult to know. One test might be to measure this against whether black
sellers do particularly badly in high crime cities. Another test might be to use
only white people, but with half the models having a neck tattoo and half not.
Both of those tests might give more of an indication about the discrimination
was animus or statistical discrimination.
Whenever we look at discrimination,
our first job is to ask whether the discrimination is unfair and socially noxious
(in which case carry on doing our best to stamp it out) or socially desirable,
as much of it is (in which case carry on promoting the benefits of discrimination).
Because remember, in the second kind of discrimination, trade and competition
depend on it. If movies do better with attractive leads, then it's in the filmmakers'
interest to hire attractive actors; if a 7 ft tall man is going to have
problems being a fireman, he should not be hired; and if a shopkeeper doesn't
want to hire a young man because he is a member of the BNP, he is perfectly
entitled to make that call.
Remember too that imprudent
animus discrimination by buyers or sellers in the marketplace penalises in
terms of personal costs to the discriminator, as I explained in this blog
post. On the other hand, statistical description is usually perfectly fair
and desirable because as the above examples show, it starts with everyone on a
level playing field and then looks to preclude those that are no longer
objectively on that field.
Employers want to hire
those who are most productive, just as the counter terrorism organisations want
to investigate the people who are most likely to be terrorists. There is
nothing unusual about that. The only thing that's unusual about this matter is
how many people there are in society that do not really understand basic
statistical principles.