I started
pondering the “character and operation” model I write about in two of my books,
and how it is in some way to do with the left and right brain elements of
cognition. Broadly speaking; the left is the logical and analytical, and the
right is intuitive and relationship-based - but not only is there overlap,
there is also distinction in how those outputs manifest themselves. So,
propositions about belief in God, attitudes about the economy, politics, the
climate, even love with a beloved, are nested in a duality of cognition based
on reason and intuition. I know my wife loves me (operation) and I sense she
loves me (character); I know capitalism works better than socialism (operation)
but I know we have a responsibility towards the underdog (character). But it
works in reverse too; socialist Jack reasons that capitalism works better than
socialism (operation) yet still becomes emotionally attached to socialist
policies (character) even if they do not yield to reason and evidence. Ditto
climate change - Jill believes that climate change is a problem that is too
complex to solve with simple off-the-peg solutions (operation), but she gets a
sense of belonging from gluing herself to the road (character), so this
instinct supervenes on her rational ones, that sort of thing.
There's some stuff in my books about this in relation to belief in God. Christians tend to believe in God because of a weight of empirical justification and rational consideration (operation) but also because of the functional fulfilment of deeper needs related to relationship, belonging and responsibility in the world (character). It's analogous to love, with it being a set of propositions that yield to reason and evidence - if my wife didn't love me, she wouldn't do x, y, and z (operation); and it being a set of deep sensations associated with relationship, belonging and responsibility (character).
Consequently, when we are talking about God with unbelievers, we have to be alert to the ways that the mind oscillates between character and operation outputs, and steer them back on track when they criss-cross (a bit like how we have to when politicians disingenuously oscillate between two different types of fairness - the Marxist type and the Aristotelian type - at their own convenience).
