In a recent article, I defined a miracle as an event that requires action from God because
it defies the natural laws or scientific explanation within His creation. I
argued that miracles are everywhere, and that they are one of the best arguments
for the truth of Christianity. Now I’d like to follow up with a philosophical
piece that considers what it’s like for a sceptic who has never experienced a
miracle, and the thought process that will hopefully aid their evaluation.
When it comes
to miracles, an open-minded agnostic has two sets of propositions to consider.
Here is the
first set:
P1: If an event
is impossible in naturalism, then it is a miracle.
P2: If a
proposition is known to be impossible, it is near-certain to be disbelieved.
P3: Christians
claim to have experienced miracles.
C: Therefore,
there is a reasonable chance that miracles occur.
Here is the
second set:
P1: If an event
is impossible in naturalism, then it is a miracle.
P2: If a
proposition is known to be impossible, it is near-certain to be disbelieved.
P3: Atheists
claim to have experienced no miracles.
C: Therefore,
there is a reasonable chance that miracles do not occur.
Let’s unpack
how we can arrive at the best conclusion about which set is most likely. Using
the well-known Popperian black swan problem, the situation with miracles works
like this. In philosophy of science, a “black swan” is something that seems
impossible or extremely unlikely because it has never been observed - like how
Europeans once believed all swans were white until black swans were discovered.
The discovery of even one black swan overturned what people thought they knew.
In the same way, when Christians testify that miraculous events occur, they are
essentially saying that “black swans” exist - relatively infrequent events that
challenge ordinary expectations. Remember, as noted in the previous article, these
events are only infrequent relative to the enormous number of non-miraculous
events that occur; they are frequent relative to the sceptic’s assumption that
they do not occur at all. Unbelievers argue that since they’ve never seen such
events, miracles probably don’t exist, much like someone who assumes all swans
are white simply because they’ve never encountered a black one.
Starting from
scratch, the empirical evaluation can be undertaken as follows. Statements that insist that black swans do exist cannot be falsified without a rigorous
search throughout the whole swan domain to confirm that there are no black
swans. But although showing that black swans exist is not easily falsified, their
existence is more easily verified, because one example of a black swan is
sufficient to verify the statement. Assigning a universal property to all items
of a set and decreeing all swans are white can be falsified by one black swan.
The trouble is, where the statement ‘all swans are white’ is relatively easy to
falsify, in most empirical investigations it is not so easily verified, because
the whole swan domain must be searched and checked before the statement “all
swans are white” can claim to be verified.
Furthermore,
one can seldom fully verify or falsify claims of a miraculous nature from the
outside, because our observations are mediated through complex and variable
conditions, through inward phenomenological experiences, and through a host of
anomalous events that fall beyond the reach of ordinary empirical
investigation. This difficulty is especially clear when we recall that
verifying the proposition “black swans exist” requires only the observation of
a single black swan - something straightforward in uncomplicated empirical
science - whereas verifying the proposition “miraculous events exist” cannot be
observed through quite the same straightforward process, since it requires us
to probe a vast, complex, and often inaccessible domain of human experience.
The statement
‘all swans are white’ is testable by being falsifiable, yet it should also be
remembered that deductive falsification is not the same as proposing an absence
of verification. In order to comprehensively falsify a grand sweeping claim,
one must compress all this hard to manage data into a true falsifying singular
statement, and sceptics who do not wish to believe tend to dismissively shade
over into selectively proactive induction as the objects they deal with get
more complex, intractable and inaccessible. The epistemological pathways for
miracles are not converged upon by this method because they are usually highlighted
by a few known dots, which can be joined by large tracts of inference and a
proactive search, rather like when one visits a single Internet web page with
just a few search tags typed into a search engine.
Given that
there is a fairly large degree of asymmetry when one compares empirical science
and the establishing of evidence of the miraculous, the swan domain is best
used analogically as a sense-making interpretive structure that seeks to piece
together numerous testimonies and anecdotal claims (the more the better) and
consider a more innovative method of investigation into the miraculous than
most sceptics currently employ.
Because
miraculous events, unless experienced first-hand, are not easily comprehended
through standard empirical methods that rely on observing patterns and drawing
general conclusions, one of the hardest things for unbelievers to apprehend is
that the full scope of created reality, with its intractable and inaccessible
web of human experiences and divine intervention, does not offer an easy
epistemological route to explaining everything naturally. Instead,
comprehending such events requires a methodology where one infers and evaluates
the experience against their own background to determine if it is truly
miraculous by the above definition.
Clearly, given
that the miraculous seems to be a dish that is only consumed by those who experience it first-hand, we can be sympathetic as to why unbelievers remain
unsatisfied with second-hand testimonies. However, sceptics must be careful not
to quarantine themselves from investigation by adopting an attitude that allows
them to hastily dismiss all anecdotal evidence as unsatisfactory and preclude
themselves from proactive investigation. When God does act miraculously in
people’s lives, one thing is abundantly clear, if you do not adopt some
proactive search or radical thought process that brings you into contact with
the real nature of the investigation, the chances of you finding this truth are
seriously minimised.
To summarise at
this point, the problem for unbelievers is that they cannot be sure that no
black swans exist unless they know for sure that miracles are impossible, and
they cannot know that miracles are impossible unless they are sure that there
are no such things as black swans. Christians do not face the same
epistemological problems because many (if not most) have experienced some kind
of miracle that has demonstrated to their satisfaction that God is active in
their life. Naturally, the unbeliever may claim that the Christians are
using a debatable explanatory filter that defaults to intelligent agency as the
best explanation of such events, but as I said in the first article, the
Christian can rightly insist on two powerful things; 1) that the unbeliever has
no experience of the Holy Spirit, so is not rightly placed to discern the
miraculous; and 2) that miracles are everywhere if you know where to look, and
remain one of the very best arguments for Christianity’s truth.
If an enquirer’s
first steps lead him into huge sense-making structures that attempt to embed a
very wide degree of life into a grand creation story narrative, where Christ is
recognised as the Creator and sustainer, then he will undoubtedly find it gets
more exciting the further he gets into it. As above, a search engine only
needs a few key search words to sift out a few web pages from millions - so, in
principle, if this venture into the miraculous is seen as a join-the-dots
experiment (that may well involve a lifetime of growth), a few dots may be
enough to put one on a solid conceptual footing to begin the adventure.
All this shows why, between the
consideration of the two sets - set 1 there's a reasonable chance that
miracles occur, or set 2 there's a reasonable chance that miracles do
not occur - set 1 is astronomically more likely than set 2. Even aside from the positive reasons to
believe in miracles cited in the previous article, on philosophical grounds too,
set 1 ought to seem more reasonable to an open-minded agnostic than set 2,
because if miracles occur by virtue of God performing them for our benefit
within the context of relationship, then you'd expect that in the vast majority
of cases, Christians are the only people to have experienced miracles in terms
of God's providence. But equally, if miracles occur because God performs them
for our benefit within the context of relationship, then it is to be expected
that most atheists have not experienced a miracle that would convince them that
miracles, and ultimately God, exist.
Therefore, given the astronomically high number of
claims of the miraculous in the world, you'd expect set 1 to have a higher
probability of being the right set of propositions than set 2. Much like, if
there were a group of people in the world who couldn't see the colour red,
you'd expect them to be the people claiming there are no such thing as a red
experience, even though a lot of other people are claiming to have had them.
And one final point that I think is
vitally important but so often neglected. Miracles won’t just pop into the
creation story in random fashion. Something as profound as the miraculous in
the creation story is going to be a deliberate intervention from God Himself,
and inevitably bound up in a deeper narrative related to how clearly and humbly
we perceive Him and discern His will, much like in the case in Mark 8:22-26 with
the healing of a blind man at Bethsaida.