In the article on my side bar (link here),
I laid out my thesis on free will and determinism - and I expanded on it even more
comprehensively in a chapter in my book The Genius of the Invisible God
(which isn’t yet available). In that book, I explain why part of the genius of
God’s creation is that we do have free will but in a deterministic universe –
although that’s too involved for this post, so you might have to buy the book
when it comes out to see why. 😊
Below is some leftover material that I
thought I’d turn into an article, as there’s lots of interesting stuff still
there.
In most cases, three quarters of a problem is solved when concepts
are defined clearly, so let me start by defining free will as the ability to make choices in a way in which
you could have made different choices. Under that definition, perhaps the
best argument against free will, would be as follows. There are only two types
of decision you can make in life - a decision based on your desire to do
something, or a decision based on being forced to do something. Every single
decision you make falls into one of those categories; you either desired to do
it or you were forced to do it against your natural desire. Your desire to do
something means you wanted to do it because you still preferred to do it when
considered against all other alternatives.
To avoid a possible misunderstanding here, your desire to do
something doesn't just mean doing the things you enjoy doing or are glad you
are doing. You might say, for example, I had my Covid vaccine, but I didn't
really desire to do it - I hate needles, and felt compelled to do it to protect
myself and others from Covid. But that doesn't mean you didn't desire to do it.
You still weighed up the other options and decided that having the vaccine was
the decision that provided the preferred utility amongst competing preferences.
You may not have enjoyed your Covid vaccine, and you may wish you lived in a
world where you didn't need it, but in having it when no one forced you to have
it, you desired to have it. When you do something you wouldn't ordinarily choose
to do with enthusiasm, it's still because your desire to do it is stronger than
competing desires, because the benefits to you outweigh the costs.
Having hopefully convinced you that every decision is either
something you desire or something you are forced to do, an argument is then put
forward to suggest that this means we don't have free will. The reasoning goes
that if you are forced to do something that you didn't desire, then that isn't
free will, but if you did desire it, that isn't free will either because we
don't control or choose what we desire. Suppose one evening I fancy watching
either Frasier or Seinfeld, and I can't choose which I prefer. I desire either
Frasier or Seinfeld, but I didn't control my desire to narrow it down to those
two options. Suppose I think about it for another couple of minutes, and then
opt for Frasier - I did so because my desire for Frasier was slightly greater than
my desire for Seinfeld. But I can't choose to desire Frasier more than Seinfeld
- it occurred within my internal cognitive machinery. We can't control any of
our desires, it seems - they happen to us within our subconscious, based on all
our experiences over a lifetime. Think of something you don't desire right now.
You probably don't desire that you will fall over and break your pelvis this
evening. And if you tried your hardest to desire it, you still wouldn't be able
to.
You may be thinking, hang on, suppose I had a slight preference
for Frasier, but I chose to override that desire and watch Seinfeld instead -
doesn't that demonstrate that I have free will? Alas, no, that doesn't solve
the problem, because all it shows is that your desire to demonstrate your
belief in free will and watch Seinfeld was stronger than your desire to watch
Frasier - you still didn't choose or have any control over the desire. We can't
change something we desire into something we don't desire, or vice versa,
without desiring to change the desire. At any point, the desire comes upon us,
we don't come upon it.
This is perhaps the most persuasive argument against free will; we
either do things we are forced to do, in which case it's not free will; or we
to something we desire to do, but we can't control our desires, in which case
it's not free will either. And to take it further, if we don't have free will,
then how can Christianity make sense, given that it's predicated on our being
sinners who must freely chose to repent and accept the price Jesus paid for our
forgiveness on the cross? How can God punish us for not repenting if we have no
desire to repent, and no control over our desire to repent, or our desire to
desire to repent? Taken at face value, it seems to put us in an unenviable
position that potentially undermines the framework of Christianity.
Yet even that argument, as well made as it appears to be, doesn't
convince me - because it doesn't seem to be speaking about the reality we know
and experience. Even if we don't fully understand all the conditions and
antecedent causes for our decisions, our desires and our will, we still live as
though we have the ability to make choices in a way in which we could have made
different choices – and that is what I will now unpack.
When you make an ethical statement -
"Jack should put back on the shelf that laptop he has just picked up to
steal" you are making a statement as though Jack has a choice. Even if you
think it's an illusion, you still think as though Jack is as agent of choices
with other alternatives. If Jack goes through with the theft, you might feel
angry with him - which suggests there is a sense in which you feel like he made
the wrong choice. Under hard determinism, for those who say our sense of free
will is illusory, are they really just angry at the universe’s deterministic
algorithms? Perhaps they think you are, but it doesn't really feel like they
are - it feels more like they are angry with Jack, in this instance.
Whichever way we cut the cloth, we act
as though people are responsible for their actions. Suppose your son comes home
from school, happy that he got top marks in his exam - you would feel a sense
of pride in is achievements. But this feeling suggests he got top marks by
efforts that could have produced alternative outcomes. Feeling a sense of pride
feels like an emotional response to a set of choices that someone you love has
made. Would you feel pride if you really felt like your son's achievements were
all just part of the universe's pre-programmed determinism, over which he had
no control? I have my doubts. Other things we do, like offer advice and
guidance, or think hard about what course of action we should take against
several alternatives, are done with our minds presupposing that agency and will
are fundamental elements in the equation.
As I said at the start, I actually do
think the universe is ultimately deterministic in the hard sense, it’s just
that our free will is of a different and more complex nature to what most
people think. But even if we take the standard free will vs. determinism debate
on the free-will-denier’s terms - when we try to decide which we accept out of
free will or determinism, we actually rationalise as though there is some free
will, but yet in accepting determinism over free will, our reasoning process is
behaving as though determinism is false.
Furthermore, we act as though there is
a point to doing things, and a purpose too. Think of your wife and children,
you home life, your job; you act as though these things are important - to you,
to your family, to the wider society - but you don't act as though you presuppose
you had to do action x, or that it was impossible to not do x. There's not a
good reason to do something if you are inevitably going to do it, and can't not
do it - yet you act as though there is a good reason to do it. In a purely
deterministic, free-will-denying world, everything is either inevitable or
impossible - and even hard determinists don't think, speak and act as though
that's true. If you don't think, speak and act in accordance with what you
claim to believe, that the belief is somewhat undermined by a stronger
interpretation of reality that you, the determinist, lives by - this
potentially defeats the foundation of the belief.
A deeper dive
Now we need to go deeper. Existence is
a complex subject, and things exist in a diverse range of ways. Ditto the
nature of being 'free' and having 'will'. Consequently, the notion of free will
existing is a spectrum, not merely a binary proposition, bound up in the
complex dynamic between first and third person phenomenology. Reality comes in the first person and third person perspectives - that
is, one's view of oneself, and the third person perspective of that self. It's
a hasty presumption to discount the concepts of 'free' and 'will' merely
through the lens of the highly deterministic particulate third person account
of human beings. Just because we believe we have got to grips with mental
activity from a third person perspective, I don't think it means we can use
that as a viable basis for ruling out degrees of free will from the first
person perspective.
The first person perspective is a different category of
consideration from the outside third person perspective - there are aspects of
first person cognition that transcend the elemental measurements of
third-person empirical analysis, even though third person manipulations of the
brain can throw up some quite bizarre altered states of consciousness. Despite
those bizarre anomalies, the fact remains that freedom from the first person
perspective has a category of intrapersonal depth and fecundity that is beyond
the lower resolution third person exploration (remember the famous 'king of
infinite space' observation in Hamlet). This kind of freedom may well belong
more in the arts than the sciences (although it can quite easily belong in
both).
Under the first person perspective, there is a complex
multidimensional spectrum of freedom, conditioned by a whole range of tenets of
personality and character qualities: truthseeking, intelligence, authenticity,
temperament, psychology, discipline, aspiration, conscientiousness, goodness,
ethics, and so on. If you take the positive elements of the above, juxtaposed
with the negative (good better than bad, truth better than falsehood,
intelligence better than stupidity, etc) then you'll find that the individual
self can enjoy a greater kind of freedom by wedding themselves to the positive
values, and a more constricting life by wedding themselves to the negative
values. Love the truth, and the world expands beyond your wildest dreams; love
goodness and your reality opens up into a joy not previously anticipated, that
sort of thing.
Given the primary facet of reality is phenomenological, I think it
is the case that these tenets of what we might call 'freedom' and 'will' do
exist. The first person reality in which they are experienced differs from the
third person deterministic reality measured from the outside, but we enter very
shaky grounds if we use that pretext to say it doesn't exist. I think there is
also Biblical truth in this notion, which St. Augustine taps into when he says
that serving God is greater freedom for us. We read from Christ that ‘Everyone
who sins is a slave to sin’ (John 8:34), but in the next breath that "‘If
the Son sets you free you will be free indeed’ (John 8:36). That seems to me to
hint at a connection between greater freedom and a greater life if we embrace
Divine things and die to those old habits.
People ensnared by naïve scientism often just can’t get to grips
with the fact that there is a complex set of phenomenological first person
experiential testimonies that not only transcend the third person perspective
of mind, they actually transcend the third person’s suite of knowledge on how
physical reality actually operates. Moreover, we need an up and running first
person mental structure that integrates our experiential qualia into coherent
patterns before we can even begin to discuss the third person ordinances of
physics, so to suggest that the latter has a more primary existence in terms of
free will over the former is quite a dodgy place to go. As soon as we become a
responsible agent, and think and act as though progress can be made, and that
some things have a higher value than other things, we live as though free
choices are an integral part of that state of being.
If we can review the past, contemplate the present, and make
forecasts about the future in relation to our decisions and values, then we
operate as though free will is part of the intellectual and emotional substrate
of our life. If as a result we get to partake in the world and relate to each
other, then phenomenologically there are no real grounds for denying that
choice and agency are fundamental to first person selfhood.