For years, I held the view that God is morally
responsible for the creation story He chose to create. Given presumably an
infinite number of possible creation stories He could have chosen, I wondered
why He chose one with quite so much suffering in it. I guess, in a C.S.
Lewis-esque ‘God in the Dock’ kind of way, I tended to put God “on trial” by
judging His creation story by my mere human standards. But about twenty five
years ago, I had an epiphany, where I started to develop the kernel of an idea
about how absurd it is to even think of our perfect, omnipotent, omniscient,
omnibenevolent God in terms of humanly discerned responsibility and
accountability. So much so, that I came to realise that it’s preposterous to
hold God morally responsible for anything, but that the reason why is far from
obvious.
When we think of human responsibility in terms of
right and wrong, and better or worse, we assign value judgements based on
various possible scenarios - and if we have high standards, a hypothetical
ideal that we bring to bear on the metric. When writing an essay, dealing with
a noisy neighbour, or fixing something in the house, we can do a good or bad
job, and make the results better or worse according to our efforts and conduct.
But that is because everything we do is measured against a standard higher than
ourselves, where however well we do, we always fall short of perfection. And
the more complex the task, the further from the ideal we end up - a bit like
how the bigger the circle we try to draw with a pencil, the less like a perfect
circle it looks.
Now, to be clear, I’m not of the school that thinks
all genuine value reduces to intrinsic value, and extrinsic value is wholly
derivative. Some philosophers subscribe to this - they contend that greatness
is identical to, and exhausted by, intrinsic value. That is, there is no
greatness in itself apart from such value, and what is called extrinsic value
is merely value derived from intrinsic value. But I reject this, because as far
as humans are concerned, it’s clearly not true that an item has extrinsic value
only insofar as it contributes to, or realises, something possessing intrinsic
value. Some values are fundamentally relational - like, say, loyalty, fairness,
courage, responsibility, artistic expression, comedy, hospitality, solidarity,
and so forth - and not merely instrumental. To put it in formal mathematical
language, even if intrinsic value exists, “greatness” is a multi-dimensional
evaluative space rather than a single axis.
I can show further why it’s wrong by applying this
to God, but with a caveat that, in actual fact, the proposition that genuine
value reduces to intrinsic value, and extrinsic value is wholly derivative, is
much truer of God than it is us. In fact, it’s nearly entirely true of God, but
not quite wholly true. To say that God is the greatest possible being is to say
that God possesses intrinsic value to the maximal degree permitted by
possibility. In other words, God instantiates intrinsic greatness at its logically
maximal extent by being the I AM under consideration (Exodus 3:14, John 5:58) -
there can be nothing greater than God. But even God, about whom there is no
possible increased greatness, has a greatness that is not maximally contained
intrinsically; and we can surmise this because we know He desired to create -
that is, to express His perfection extrinsically in creation - in order that He
could have a loving relationship with His creation. God couldn’t have been
maximally manifest or wholly fulfilled in His intrinsic perfection because He
desired extrinsic value in terms of loving relationships. Don’t get me wrong, I
do think God’s desire to create is itself part of His perfection, and His
relationality is not a limitation but an expression of maximal perfection. But
it must be true that God + creation is superior to God alone; otherwise, God
would have had no reason to create anything at all.
An analogy from physics might help. We could think
of intrinsic value like a rest mass: a property something has in itself,
independent of external reference frames; and extrinsic value as being like
kinetic energy - it exists only relative to interactions or relations; it is
not a fundamental property but one that arises from a system’s relation to
something else (a frame of reference, a field, a transformation). On this
analogy, claiming that a being’s value is entirely intrinsic is like claiming
that a particle’s rest mass is its fundamental property, while any additional
energies - such as kinetic or potential energy - are purely relational and
therefore derivative. And when applied to God, the analogy suggests that
calling God the greatest possible Being is akin to saying that, if a particle
possessed the highest rest mass permitted by physical law, that intrinsic
property would define its fundamental status, with all other forms of energy
remaining secondary and relational.
Perhaps now
you can see what I mean by saying that it’s preposterous to hold God morally
responsible for anything. Jack is morally responsible if he chooses to commit a
bad act instead of a good one, or does a bad job rewiring the house because he
chose to get drunk, because he had better options available to him, and better
versions of himself that could have conducted those decisions. But our perfect,
omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent God cannot do anything better, and has
no higher intrinsic or extrinsic state He can manifest. So, therefore, He
cannot be responsible for something He cannot possibly be or enact, and He
cannot possibly be or enact anything that is not good or perfect.
You may say
that in attributing goodness and perfection to God through my human-centric
lens I am making a value judgement and assigning some kind of positive
responsibility, but only insofar as I am projecting human standards onto a Being for whom such standards simply do not apply in quite the way a human can
understand. It’s perhaps a bit like how a dog can discern a happy marriage from
an unhappy one, but could only import crude canine speculation about the nature
of deep love between beloveds.
God cannot
be morally responsible for who He is, and who He is, is perfection, under which
He has maximal compulsion to do the greatest things, even if by our human
standards we might foolishly dwell in the illusion that we are equipped to act
as judge. The accused stands above indictment, and the plaintiff lacks standing
to bring a case.