The Game of Words

In his Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein argued against the idea that every concept has a strict set of "necessary and sufficient conditions" that define it. Instead, with his 'Language Games' and his 'Family Resemblance Principle' he understood concepts through shared features that overlap in various ways, rather than through a strict set of essential criteria. Here's a passage of note, in which he compared language to being like describing various games:

“There must be something common, or they would not be called ‘games’”–but look and see whether there is anything common to all. For if you look at them you will not see something common to all, but similarities, relationships, and a whole series of them at that. To repeat: don’t think, but look! Look for example at board games, with their multifarious relationships. Now pass to card games; here you find many correspondences with the first group, but many common features drop out, and others appear. When we pass next to ball games, much that is common is retained, but much is lost. Are they all ‘amusing’? Compare chess with noughts and crosses. Or is there always winning and losing, or competition between players? Think of patience. In ball games there is winning and losing; but when a child throws his ball at the wall and catches it again, this feature has disappeared. Look at the parts played by skill and luck; and at the difference between skill in chess and skill in tennis. Think now of games like ring-a-ring-a-roses; here is the element of amusement, but how many other characteristic features have disappeared! And we can go through the many, many other groups of games in the same way; can see how similarities crop up and disappear. And the result of this examination is: we see a complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing: sometimes overall similarities, sometimes similarities of detail.”

Let me say, in using the term ‘games’, Wittgenstein is not being in the least bit trivial or frivolous here – he is stating something rigorous about the entanglements into which humans get themselves through their misuse of language. The precise definitions and contextualisations in our language are not strictly and clearly demarcated – they seamlessly integrate like the characteristics of a family integrate. Choosing the language we use to discuss a particular topic is like choosing a game and adhering to its rules. Just as we shouldn’t use the rules of chess when playing tennis, equally we shouldn’t apply the wrong kind of language to the wrong discussion. When Wittgenstein talks of our seeing a complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing, he means that some of the terms used are used carelessly, and as such, these errors militate against fruitful discussion.

The trouble that underlies many discussions is that those jointly sufficient terms are often misused, and this amounts to people criss-crossing their communication and getting their language entangled in knots. So, while some misunderstandings may arise from misuse, Wittgenstein was more focused on the idea that people often expect language to function with fixed meanings when, in fact, meanings shift based on context.

I think this is a useful thing to learn from as young an age as possible – apprehending the importance of the Wittgensteinian method of using language like we use tools, where words are jointly sufficient for many disciplines, and discerning the extent to which language evolves in a fluid, context-dependent manner, even within individual dialogue over time. In religious discussions, for example, words like God, soul, spirit, proof, evidence, morality, purpose, good, evil, fact, miracle, beauty, heaven, hell, faith and sin are good examples of this. In political discussions, words like fair, justice, freedom, equality and rights are also good examples of this.

I would say the main reason discussions frequently result in needless discord is because we construct our language in a proprietary way in an attempt to make sense of the reality with which we interface – and as such, we are always operating within one particular language game or another, which changes when we change subject. The trouble is, there is no meta-structure from which we can stand back and appraise the language games, because even in appraising a particular language game, we are still operating from within a language game when doing so.

Finally, even more importantly than science, philosophy and politics, marriage is a shared language game between beloveds. Successful relationships often rely on couples developing their own set of shared meanings and language, where they can understand each other more effectively through clear communication. Due to different backgrounds and experiences, what one beloved means by “support,” “honesty”, “listening”, “love,” "commitment,", "happiness or “respect” is likely to differ from another’s interpretation of those terms. These words, and many like them, don’t have fixed meanings – they must be shaped by the couple’s evolving experiences and honest development of mutual understanding.